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2 
Equity Ownership Groups, Investment and Liquidity: Evidence from Ukraine 
 
Abstract 
We empirically investigate the impact of different ownership groups on companies’ 
investment in Ukraine with a novel dynamic investment model where investment is based on 
present and historical levels of profitability (market-to-book value of equity) and lagged 
investment. Groups include state, insider, non-domestic, financial and financial and industrial 
group (FIG) ownership. Contrary to the literature, we find that the past level of profitability 
significantly affects investment; the presence of and increases in state ownership have a 
negative impact on firms’ investment, as is the case for non-domestic and financial 
companies’ ownership. Insider and FIG ownership have no impact on investment. We explain 
the results by the extent of liquidity concerns (hard and soft budget constraints) and the extent 
of asset stripping for the corresponding ownership group and relate them to over- and under-
investment, and to the free cash flow or cash constraint hypothesis. 
Keywords: Investment, Ownership, Corporate Governance, Investment, Financial 
Constraints, Soft Budget Constraints. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent research in corporate finance and governance provides evidence that agency and 
informational issues make the ownership structure of firms relevant for its performance (for 
example, Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)). Recent studies of 
companies’ investment behavior and ownership structures emphasize the role of liquidity 
(hard and soft budget constraints) and asset stripping. 
          In this paper, in contrast to the literature, we empirically investigate the impact of 
different equity ownership groups on companies’ investment with a novel dynamic 
investment model where investment is based on present and historical levels of profitability 
(market-to-book value of equity), lagged investment and the sensitivity of investment with 
respect to cash flow of the ownership groups to capture soft and hard budget constraints. 
Companies may base their investment decisions not just on current profitability of investment 
or Tobin’s Q but also on historical values thereof and a good predictor for current investment 
may be past investment. We apply this model to a panel data set of Ukrainian stock market 
listed industrial and manufacturing firms for the period 2002 to 2007. The ownership groups 
include state, insider, non-domestic, financial, and financial and industrial group (FIG) 
ownership. We also investigate the impact of the existence of a significant minority with the 
ability to block major decisions within the company on investment. 
In addition, we investigate a reduced form regression (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein 
(1991) and Perotti and Vesnaver (2004)) with the present value of the market-to-book value 
and the overall cash flow sensitivity of investment as explanatory variables.  
             Contrary to the literature, we find that the past level of the market to book value of 
equity (MBV) significantly affects investment; the presence of and increases in state 
ownership have a negative impact on firms’ investment, as is the case for non-domestic and 
financial companies’ ownership. Insider and FIG ownership have no impact on investment. 
We explain the results by the extent of liquidity concerns (hard and soft budget constraints) 
and the extent of asset stripping for the corresponding ownership group, gauge the relative 
effect of these factors and relate them to over- and under-investment.   
There are several studies analyzing the impact of ownership structures on companies’ 
investment in Central and Eastern European transition countries: Lizal and Svejnar (2002) 
(Czech Republic),  Perotti and Vesnaver (2004) (Hungary),  Mickiewicz, Bishop and 
Varblane (2004) (Estonia), Colombo and Stanca (2006) (Hungary). The following stylized 
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facts emerge. First, the market-to-book value of equity (MBV), a measure of the profitability 
of investment, is usually not used in these investment regressions. If the market to book value 
is used, as in Perotti and Vesnaver (2004), it turns out not to have explanatory power for 
investment. This is usually attributed to immature capital markets. The conventional wisdom 
is that especially in Central and Eastern European capital markets, a Tobin’s Q model should 
not be used in analyzing investment.  Second, state ownership has a negligible impact on 
companies’ investment rates. Third, there is evidence for the presence of soft budget 
constraints for state ownership and financial imperfections for other groups and evidence for 
the cash constraint theory.  
In a related paper, Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013), with a data set that also includes 
financial firms, use the change in Tobin’s Q, but not lagged investment, as explanatory 
variables and emphasize the role of private benefits of control. They provide evidence for a 
significantly negative impact of state ownership on investment, but a positive impact of 
financial firm ownership on investment. Mykhayliv and Zauner (2015) analyze the 
probability of investment using a survey of non-listed Ukrainian manufacturing firms. 
          Analyzing the determinants of the performance of firms including firms’ investment 
has been an important topic in the economic literature for decades. In the context of 
economies that are in transition from state ownership structures to Western market economies 
(Megginson and Netter (2001)), the analysis of the determinants of the growth of fixed assets 
of firms is even more important. The Central and Eastern European economies were subject 
to privatization efforts to move them away from state ownership structures and closer to 
market economies, and, thereby, it had been hoped, improving the performance of firms (see 
Roland (2000)). The relationship between state ownership and companies’ performance is of 
particular interest (Megginson and Netter (2001)). Surprisingly, a stylized fact is that the 
impact of state ownership on investment is weak in Central and Eastern European countries 
(cf. World Bank (2002)). 
          An important factor in explaining companies’ investment rates of state owned 
companies is the concept of soft budget constraints (Kornai (1979), Kornai (1980), Kornai, 
Maskin and Roland (2003)), that is, activities that allow companies to neglect financial 
discipline. Even though there is ample evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints, 
the empirical link between companies’ performance (Djankov and Murrell (2002),  Estrin and 
Rosevear (1999, 1999a), Grygorenko and Lutz (2007)) or investment (Lizal and Svejnar 
(2002), Perotti and Vesnaver (2004)) on one hand and state ownership on the other is weak.  
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The second factor in explaining investment is related to actions that reduce the value of 
the company in order to improve the private welfare of some individuals or groups who are 
able to exert control over the company against the welfare of shareholders. These actions are 
commonly labelled tunnelling ((Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silvanes and Shleifer (2000)), 
asset stripping (Campos and Giovannoni (2006), Ochoa et al. (2015)) or, in a less pronounced 
form, private benefits of control ((Grossman and Hart (1988), Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013)). 
The third factor is related to financial imperfections in the form of hard budget 
constraints or financial constraints (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), see also Barran 
and Peeters (1998), Bassetto and Kalatzis (2011), Wet (2004)). Under perfect capital markets 
without taxes and the assumption that the individual investor faces the same borrowing rate 
as firms, the capital structure of a company is irrelevant (Modigliani and Miller (1958)), that 
is, it does not matter whether internal or external funds are used to finance investment. 
However, it is well known that external funds are typically costlier than internal funds due to 
agency and informational issues.  Given these three and other factors, ownership plays an 
important role in the performance  and investment behavior of companies, particularly where 
ownership and control functions are separated (Fama and Jensen (1983), Belkhir et al. 
(2014)).  
We relate our results to recent theories that to a large degree explain companies’ 
investment rates, the cash constraint and the management discretion theory (Hadlock (1998)) 
or the free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986). The cash constraints theory relates investment 
rates to hard budget constraints whereas the management discretion theory and the free cash 
flow theory relates them to the abusive use of funds by the management to build empires and 
to increase their private welfare to the detriment of the value of the company or to soft budget 
constraints. These two theories are also relevant for the issue of over- versus under-
investment. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the models. Section 
3 provides the estimation results. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Companies’ Investment Rates and Ownership Groups 
 
In this paper, we use the data set in Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) with 134 listed, large 
Ukrainian companies and 590 observations over the years 2002 to 2007. The companies in 
the data set come from different sectors of the Ukrainian economy, in particular, electricity 
and energy (21.54%), engineering (11.96%), mining (11.96%), metals (6.72%), steel 
(6.72%),  chemicals (6.72%), and others. More details on the data set can be found in 
Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013).  Summary statistics are contained in Table I. The data set is 
derived from Dragon Capital (2006, 2007)), the First Securities Trading System PFTS 
(http://www.pfts.com.ua/ukr/) and the Agency for the Development of Infrastructure for 
Funds Market in Ukraine (www.smida.gov.uk).  The ownership data were checked using the 
Ukrainian business press.  The ownership data relate for almost all observations to the year 
2005. For some companies the ownership data relate to 2006. There are a few companies for 
which the ownership data relate to 2005 and 2006. We assume the ownership data for earlier 
[later] years are the same as the ownership data for the first [last] available year. Therefore, 
the time dependency of the ownership data is extremely limited and can be viewed as 
constant over the period. Summary statistics of the ownership group shares are given in Table 
II. 
We drop financial firms from the sample as their behavior appears to be different from 
manufacturing, industrial and utility firms and we are left with a pool of 566 observations and 
125 firms. 
Table I: Summary of Financials in US$. 
Financials Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Total Assets 358938.7 643963.5 8558 74199651 
Fixed Assets 162428.8 264431 433 2052003 
Investment 35233.5 82375.06 -114297 803287 
MBV 2.368675 6.148593 0 99.56863 
Net Income 22927.35 65477.76 -162091 580383 
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Note. Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of financials in thousands of US$. MBV is the market-
to-book value of equity. Source: Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) 
Table II: Ownership Group Shares 
Variable Mean (%) Std. Dev. Min (%) Max(%) 
State 14.74 0.2784 0 96.8 
Insider 12.57 0.2841 0 96 
NonDomestic 18.21 0.3203 0 98.3 
Finance 16.94 0.312 0 100 
FIG 35.88 0.4064 0 100 
Note. Mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the ownership group shares. FIG stands for 
financial and industrial groups. Source: Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) 
Mykhayliv and Zauner (2010, 2013) introduce private benefits of control into a Tobin’s 
Q investment model. The private benefits of control are modeled as shares of cash flow that 
can be diverted out of the company at the expense of passive shareholders.  This implies that 
investment is impacted by marginal Q, a measure of the profitability of investment, hard and 
soft budget constraints, shares of ownership groups potentially enjoying private benefits of 
control and control variables.  
In contrast to Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) where the change in Tobin’s Q is used, in 
this paper, we empirically investigate a Tobin’s Q model with persistence in the market-to-
book value of equity in the sense that investment depends on current and past market-to-book 
values. We hypothesize that investment decisions are based on present and historical values 
of the profitability of investment. In addition, we introduce lagged investment as an 
explanatory variable in order to capture the effect that the best predictor of investment at the 
company level may be lagged investment (Eberly et al. (2012)). 
We follow the literature and use a positive cash flow coefficient as evidence for hard 
budget constraints and an insignificant or negative cash flow coefficient as evidence for soft 
budget constraints (Mickiewicz, Bishop and Varblane (2004), Lizal and Svejnar (2002)). As 
in Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013), we use ownership shares and indicators of different 
categories of firms to measure the ownership shares of controllers potentially enjoying 
private benefits.  Since private benefits of control have to be financed, cash flow may also 
reflect the constraints from financing private benefits. Hence, the estimate for the ownership 
shares or indicators may indicate the impact of private benefits of control on investment not 
already captured by cash flow. 
Depreciation 12509.5 37864.57 -2628 756780 
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3. Dynamic Q model and Results 
 
First, in contrast to Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013), we investigate a reduced form regression 
motivated by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and Perotti and Vesnaver (2004) with 
only the present value of the market-to-book value as an explanatory variable. We focus on a 
model where the dependent variable is the investment rate (investment to fixed assets ratio) 
the explanatory variables are the present market-to-book value of equity and ownership group 
shares or indicators. Control variables are the cash flow to fixed assets ratio, the total assets to 
fixed assets ratio, the leverage to fixed assets ratio and the log of total assets. In this 
regression, the market-to-book value of equity is a proxy for the investment’s profitability. 
Cash flow is a proxy for liquidity, soft or hard budget constraints, and the log of total assets is 
a proxy for size. 
In this regression, we use a proxy related to the tangibility of assets (Almeida and 
Campello (2007), Perotti and Vesnaver (2004)). Perotti and Vesnaver (2004) use the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. Since we normalize the regression equation by fixed assets, we use 
the total assets to fixed assets ratio, the reciprocal of Perotti and Vesnaver’s (2004) variable. 
We interpret the ratio of total assets to fixed assets as a proxy for the intangibility of assets. 
We expect that the total assets to fixed assets ratio has a negative impact on investment since 
firms with a large value of this variable tend to have a large value of intangible assets which 
is likely to imply a negative impact on investment, the change in fixed assets. This negative 
impact of the intangibility of assets on investment is consistent with Perotti and Vesnaver 
(2004) who find a significantly positive impact of the fixed assets to total assets ratio (the 
reciprocal variable we use) on investment. 
         The regression includes the following set of ownership groups: state ownership (state), 
insider or management ownership (insider), non-domestic ownership (non-domestic), 
ownership by banks and other financial companies (finance) and ownership by financial and 
industrial groups and holdings (FIG). We also investigate a corporate governance variable, 
minority, that is, majority ownership with a blocking minority, which relates to the 
effectiveness of minority shareholder protection. 
We analyze two versions of the model, by focussing on a specification where 
ownership is measured in shares and where ownership is measured by an indicator variable 
with a 50% cut-off value. 
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The two regressions are given by 
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where i relates to firm i, t  relates to year; itI  is new investment, the difference between fixed 
assets at the end and the beginning of year t taking depreciation into account, itA is fixed 
assets at the beginning of year t; itMBV  is the market-to-book value of equity at the 
beginning of period t; itCF is cash flow in year t; itAssets  are total assets at the beginning of 
year t (so that 
it
it
A
Assets
 is the total assets to fixed assets ratio, our proxy for the intangibility 
of assets); itL  is leverage (total debt) at the beginning of year t; log is the natural logarithm;
j
its is ownership of group j  ( FIGfinancedomesticnoninsiderstatej ,,,,  )  where the 
ownership is either measured in shares or as an indicator  with value 1 if there is a majority 
ownership of the respective ownership group; orityitd
min  is indicator for  minority; td  are time 
indicators, t is a time trend, iv is a firm specific error term; and it  is the usual ordinary least 
squares error term. 
Table III presents the results of a random effects regression of ownership in shares and 
in indicator variables. We employ a random effects regression in order to estimate the 
coefficients of the ownership variables that have a very limited time dependency. 
 
 
Table III: Impact of Ownership on Investment Rates: Group Ownership Shares (Shares) and 
Group Ownership Indicator Variable (Indicator) Specification 
 
 Shares Indicator 
Market-to-
book value  
-.0033  
(.0046) 
-.0033 
(.0046) 
Cash Flow   .9484
***
 
(.0114) 
.9493
*** 
(.0114) 
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Intangibility 
of Assets
# 
-.4760
*** 
(.0074) 
-.4764
*** 
(.0074) 
Leverage .5244
*** 
(.0097) 
.5252
*** 
(.0097) 
Log Total 
Assets 
.0289
 
(.0283) 
.0280 
(.0281) 
State -.4139
*** 
(.1268) 
-.3112
*** 
(.0938) 
Insider .0902  
(.1238) 
.0622  
(.0950) 
Non-domestic -.0972  
(.0949) 
-.0876 
(.0778) 
Finance .0968  
(.0997) 
-.0106 
(.0852) 
FIG .0094  
(.0878) 
.0376
 
(.0725) 
Significant 
Minority 
.1141  
(.1024)
 
.1471 
(.1038) 
Constant 57.9526 
(48.7286) 
60.8004 
(48.8446) 
Wald χ2 7036.50  
(.0000) 
7016.69 
(0.0000) 
R
2
  0.8810 0.8796 
Note. Random Effects Estimation.  Standard errors are given in brackets below the estimates. The 10 (5) [1] % 
level is shown as * (**) and [***]. The estimates for a time trend and year indicator variables are not reported. # 
The intangibility of assets is defined as the ratio of total assets to fixed assets. 
 
The results show that the market-to-book values of equity are not significant in these 
regressions, as in Perotti and Vesnaver (2004). The estimate for the cash flow variable is 
positive and highly significant, consistent with the presence of financial constraints. Larger 
firms have higher investment rates. In contrast to Perotti and Vesnaver (2004), leverage 
positively impacts investment and is highly significant. The intangibility of assets has a 
negative impact on investment. In contrast to Lizal and Svejnar (2002) and Perotti and 
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Vesnaver (2002), state ownership has a negative impact on investment. Other ownership 
variables have no significant effect on investment rates. 
We apply further robustness checks on the models in Table III. Ordinary least squares 
regression while controlling for industry fixed effects (19 different industries) produce 
quantitatively similar results. Similarly, a firm random effects specification and, at the same 
time, controlling for industry-fixed effects again produces similar results. As expected, due to 
the very limited time variability of the ownership data, a firm fixed effects specification with 
industry fixed effects renders all ownership variables insignificant but confirms the sign and 
magnitude of all other explanatory variables. 
We also run random effects regressions where we drop the variable related to the 
intangibility of assets in the above regression equation. In these regressions, all the ownership 
group variables turn out to be insignificant. 
There may be concerns about the potential endogeneity of the ownership variables. 
Concerns about endogeneity of the ownership variables are of little importance due to the 
following reasons. First, recall that the ownership variables are only related to the year 2005 
and for some observations (less than 10 percent of observations) ownership data are also 
available for 2006.  If ownership data are available for 2006, then for most of these 
observations, the ownership data in year 2005 and 2006 coincide. To obtain ownership 
observations for the other years, we assume that the ownership data for the years 2002 to 
2004 are the same as in 2005 and the ownership data for 2007 are the same as in 2006 (or 
2005 if 2006 data not available). Therefore the ownership data are essentially constant over 
the 2002 to 2007 period. However, other variables of interest, including investment rates and 
the market-to-book value of equity, have a relatively high degree of time-variability as they 
are observed in each period and are different across periods. Second, the ownership variables 
and many right hand variables, for example, the market-to-book value, are observed at the 
beginning of the period, whereas investment is observed during the period. As it is well 
known in firms’ investment studies (for example, Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2007, p. 
707)), such explanatory variables, although not strictly exogenous, can be viewed as 
predetermined. Third, the state ownership category in the sample has an even lower degree of 
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time-variability than other ownership categories. For these reasons, concerns about the 
endogeneity bias in the ownership variables are of little importance.1  
 
Lagged Investment, Present and Past Market-to-Book Value of Equity 
 
Since the present profitability of investment plays no role in the reduced form regression 
above, we model the market-to-book value of equity more carefully. First, we introduce 
interaction terms between cash flow and the different ownership groups to test for soft and 
hard budget constraints of the different ownership groups and, second, in contrast with the 
literature, we introduce present and past market-to-book value of equity in the regression in 
order to take into account that investment decisions may also be based on historical values of 
the profitability of investment and third, we introduce lagged investment as an explanatory 
variables in order to capture the effect that the best predictor of investment at the company 
level is lagged investment (Eberly et al. (2012)). The regressions are given by  
,
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where, in addition to above, kitd  is the indicator related to ownership group k (with cut-off 
level at 50%) and the interaction term between cash flow and ownership group indicator, in 
other words, the cash flow sensitivity of investment, 
k
it
it
it d
A
CF
, is a proxy for soft and hard 
budget constraints of ownership group k. 
In order to deal with the issue of contemporaneous and lagged values of the market-to-
book ratio, the potential multicollinearity and inconsistency of the estimators, we analyze this 
dynamic model to control for potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables and employ 
the two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments estimator (Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998)) and its improvement by Windmeijer (2005) where the 
regression is estimated simultaneously in levels and first differences. Standard statistical tests 
                                                          
1 In a previous version, we experimented with an instrumental variables approach motivated by Lins (2003) and Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001). 
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are used to test the suitability and validity of the instrumental variables without having to 
resort to analyzing a first stage regression.  
In this estimation we believe that investment depends on lagged investment  (Eberly et 
al. (2012) and that the market-to-book value of equity and the variables related to cash flow 
may be potentially endogenous, that is, current and past errors may be correlated with current 
and future values of the market-to-book value and the variables related to cash flow. 
Generalized Methods of Moments instruments of the level and difference regression equation 
for the market-to-book value of equity and the interaction terms cash flow with indicators of 
ownership groups are specified as the values of the twice-lagged and earlier variables. 
Generalized Methods of Moments instruments for the predetermined variable Leverage are 
specified as the values of the once-lagged variable.  The usual instruments for the level and 
difference regression equation are the exogenous ownership variables and the lagged-once 
capital intensity, time dummies and a time trend.  In order to reduce the numbers of 
instruments, we collapse the instruments as discussed in Roodman (2006, section 3.2 and 
3.5). 
We test the suitability of the instruments using standard tests in the Generalized 
Methods of Moments framework, the Sargan (1958) test and Hansen (1982) J-test, including 
all subgroups of instruments. If the instrumental variables regression is over-identified, both 
tests allow us to verify whether the moment conditions are jointly valid. All difference-in-
Hansen tests for the null hypothesis that the instrument subsets are exogenous are 
insignificant, with the lowest p-value of 0.121 (0.143) in the percentage (indicator) ownership 
model. We also check the suitability of the instruments using the Arellano-Bond (1991) test 
for the autoregressive model of order 1 and the autoregressive model of order 2 in first 
differences which looks for autocorrelation  in the errors. Both tests do not lead us to question 
the validity of the instruments and the employed lags in the instruments. We present the 
results of the Generalized Methods of Moments estimation of the investment model in Table 
IV. 
 
Table IV: Investment Rates and Ownership: Generalized Methods of Moments Estimation 
Investment Percentage Indicator 
Lagged Investment 
-.1547 
(.1123) 
-.1740  
(.1109) 
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Present MBV 
-.0006 
(.0038) 
.0010  
(.0045) 
Lagged MBV 
.0028
*** 
(.0007) 
.0029
*** 
(.0007) 
State*CF 
-.0399 
(.1333) 
-.0692 
(.1320) 
Insider*CF 
.0214 
(.2510) 
-.0425  
(.1872) 
Non-domestic*CF 
.9890
*** 
(.0096) 
.9886
*** 
(.0096) 
Finance*CF 
1.3063
**
 
(.5636) 
1.3223
** 
(.5311) 
FIG*CF 
-.8466 
(.5822) 
-.8463 
(.5413) 
Leverage 
-.0190  
(.0191) 
-.0252  
(.0173) 
Log Total Assets 
.0066 
(.0180) 
.0137 
(.0190) 
State 
-.1355
* 
(.0742) 
-.0998
* 
(.0552) 
Insider 
.0080  
(.0937) 
.0360 
(.0669) 
Non-domestic 
-.2301
*** 
(.0568) 
-.2340
*** 
(.0521) 
Finance 
-.2411
* 
(.1435) 
-.2197
* 
(.1221) 
FIG 
.1508 
(.1441) 
.1499 
(.1146) 
Significant Minority 
-.0129  
(.0751) 
.0212  
(.0665) 
Constant 
.1832 
(.2138) 
.0869 
(.2250) 
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F-Test 
(p-value)
 
847.86 
(.0000) 
924.94 
(.0000) 
Number Instruments 40 39 
Sargan 
(p-value) 
27.28 
(0.162) 
25.32  
(0.189) 
Hansen J 
(p-value) 
20.21  
(0.508) 
19.74  
(0.474) 
 
Lagged investment (Eberly et al. (2012)) does not have explanatory power in the 
regressions. 
The estimate for the present market-to-book value of equity is insignificant. However, 
the past value is highly significant and positive providing support for the more general model.  
We discuss the impact of the ownership categories on firms’ investment in turn, both 
for the indicator and percentage model. The indicator specification can be interpreted as the 
impact of the presence of a majority ownership of the respective ownership group on 
investment rates, whereas the percentage specification can be interpreted as the impact of an 
increase in ownership shares of the respective ownership group on firms’ investment rates.  
For each ownership group we discuss the impact of the particular ownership type on firms’ 
investment rates and also on the interaction of cash flow and the indicator of the particular 
ownership type to provide evidence for soft and hard budget constraints of the ownership 
type.  
State ownership exerts a negative influence on firms’ investment. This is in contrast 
with the typical result regarding Eastern European economies (see, for example, Lizal and 
Svejnar (2002) and Perotti and Vesnaver (2004)). The cash flow sensitivity with respect to 
state ownership (State*CF) is not significant which indicates that state-owned companies 
face soft budget constraints. State ownership has a significantly negative impact on firms’ 
investment rates. The two results together are consistent with the presence of free cash flow 
(Jensen (1986)), and private benefits of control (Grossman and Hart (1988)). Even though 
there is evidence for free cash flow, the negative relationship of state ownership and 
investment, and the fact that on average companies with state ownership have market-to-book 
values of less than unity indicates that there is evidence for under-investment. 
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Insider ownership does not significantly impact firms’ investment rates. The variable 
Insider*CF is positive, but insignificant indicating that insider owned firms do not face hard 
but soft budget constraints and appear to be subject to free cash flow (Jensen (1986)) and 
private benefits. These two results seem to indicate that that there is over-investment for 
insider ownership. 
Firms with ownership by non-domestic entities and by banks and financial firms 
experience a negative impact on firms’ investment rates and hard budget constraints. These 
findings are consistent with the cash constraint hypothesis and can be interpreted as evidence 
for under-investment.  
Ownership by financial and industrial groups (FIG) faces free cash flow and soft 
budget constraints, but the investment rates are not significantly impacted. This provides 
some evidence for over-investment. The corporate governance variable related to a blocking 
minority does not impact on firms’ investment rates significantly. 
In contrast to Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) who investigate a related Tobin’s Q model 
using a data set that also includes financial firms, we find that the past market to book value 
of equity has a significant effect on investment rates and that financial companies’ ownership 
has a negative impact on investment and suffers from hard budget constraints. However, that 
paper also provides useful robustness tests that show that other main results still hold in this 
novel investment model. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Using data from large Ukrainian firms for the period 2002-2007, we study companies’ 
investment rates as a function of ownership. We focus on two specifications: (i) the presence 
of a particular ownership group with a majority and (ii) increases in the shares of particular 
ownership groups. In contrast to the literature, we use present and past market-to-book values 
of equity and lagged investment as explanatory variables in the regressions. The empirical 
analysis shows that the past market-to-book value of equity explains investment rates 
implying that investment decisions are taken based also on historical values of the 
profitability of investment. However, lagged investment does not have explanatory power in 
the investment regressions. 
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The results add to the literature. State ownership is related to soft budget constraints 
and free cash flow (Jensen (1986)) and negatively impacts investment due to private benefits 
of control. State owned firms suffer from under-investment. Ownership by insiders is related 
to free cash flow and soft budget constraints and do not suffer from under-investment. 
Ownership by non-domestic or finance firms is related to hard budget constraints consistent 
with the cash constraint hypothesis.  The negative impact of non-domestic and finance 
company ownership on investment rates is evidence for under-investment in such companies. 
The empirical model that includes past values of the market to book value of equity is 
supported by the data, as is the importance of liquidity and asset stripping in explaining 
firms’ investment. For future research, we aim to extend the analysis to other transitional 
economies and provide a theoretical structural model. 
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